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In this paper, we investigate the effects of increasing exchange rate flexibility at the margin instead of 
comparing the polar regimes of fixed and flexible rates. A VAR model with a structural analysis of the 
financial sector, including exchange rate intervention, is set up for a set of five major industrial countries 
and estimated using monthly data from the post-Bretton Woods period. IRFs suggest that in most countries 
intervention appears to be effective, although responses seem very short-lived, lasting just a few months. 
Counterfactual experiments are undertaken in which the central bank limits exchange rate fluctuations 
within a prescribed band.  Varying the bandwidths shows that the only variable that systematically changes 
is foreign reserves, which become more volatile with a narrower band. Greater exchange rate flexibility 
obtained through wider bands neither increases nor decreases volatilities in the interest rate, output, or 
inflation for the majority of cases. Our results suggest that exchange rate stability is not necessarily earned 
at the cost of sacrificing interest rate stability and thereby support the idea that stable exchange rates can be 
welfare improving from a purely domestic point of view and for countries with heavy external debt.  
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 1. Introduction  
 
Exchange rates among major industrial countries continue to fluctuate in large magnitudes. The 
euro declined more than 30 percent against the dollar in less than 20 months following its January 1999 
inception before completely recovering by the end of 2002. The Japanese yen was no less volatile over the 
same period, fluctuating nearly 30 percent over the same three year period. Understanding the implications 
of these exchange rate changes is an important step in determining the relative merits of various exchange 
rate arrangements. Among other things, whether flexible exchange rates stabilize output and/or inflation 
more effectively than fixed rates in the presence of diverse shocks is a perennial issue in international 
finance.  
The stabilizing property of exchange rate flexibility is model specific and dependent on the types 
of shocks.
 For instance, according to the Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch model, fixed rate regimes have a 
superior stabilizing property against nominal shocks while flexible exchange rates can better handle real 
shocks. Nevertheless, the presumption is that greater exchange rate flexibility reduces volatility in the 
interest rate and that output and inflation are likely to be more stable with increases in exchange rate 
variability; see Friedman (1953). Frenkel and Mussa (1980) most succinctly represent this view, termed 
“conservation of volatility” by Flood and Rose (1995): stabilizing the exchange rate “may only transfer the 
effect of disturbances from the foreign exchange market to somewhere else in the economic system. … 
Since the foreign exchange market is a market in which risk can easily be bought and sold, it may be 
sensible to concentrate disturbances in this market, rather than transfer them to other markets, such as labor 
markets, where they cannot be dealt with in as efficient a manner.” (p. 379)  
Typical empirical studies on the issue compare the volatility of macroeconomic variables under 
different exchange rate regimes. Other than greater variability of real and nominal exchange rates in a 
flexible rate regime, Baxter and Stockman (1989) find little evidence of systematic differences in the 
behavior of macroeconomic aggregates under alternative exchange rate systems (pegged, floating, and 
cooperative systems). Similarly, Flood and Rose (1995) report that the volatility of macroeconomic 
variables such as money and output does not change much across exchange rate regimes and conclude that 
there is no clear tradeoff between reduced exchange rate volatility and macroeconomic stability. They 
argue that “the exchange rate volatility is not in fact transferred to some other part of the economy; it   3
simply seems to vanish.” (p. 4) On the other hand, Ghosh et al. (1997) find that pegged regimes are 
characterized by lower and more stable inflation but more pronounced output volatility. Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2003) report that greater exchange rate flexibility promotes economic growth and reduces 
output volatility in developing countries while it has no significant effects on either in industrial countries. 
Other studies of the stabilizing property of the exchange rate regime have investigated narrower 
and more precisely defined types of shocks. For instance, Hutchison and Walsh (1992) employ structural 
VAR methods to show that flexible exchange rates allowed Japan some insulation from external influences, 
and thus were stabilizing compared to the Bretton Woods system. Broda (2001) finds that flexible rates 
were stabilizing for a panel of countries against terms-of-trade shocks. While an improvement over the 
earlier studies, these studies suffer from the same fundamental problem that all differences in the behavior 
of the variable under consideration are attributed to the change in the exchange rate regime.  
A recently-recognized problem with empirical studies that condition their results on the extant 
exchange rate regime is that the nominal classification of the regime may be incorrect, as revealed by Calvo 
and Reinhart (2002) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2002). Even when countries say their currencies float, they 
often engage in heavy intervention in the foreign exchange market; conversely, when other countries claim 
to fix their exchange rates, they frequently undergo devaluation cycles. Therefore, a lack of guidance for 
proper classification of the exchange rate regime complicates interpretation of the empirical results.
1  
Truly fixed or flexible exchange rates for a significant length of time are a rarity. Very often, an 
important policy question for countries operating on the wide spectrum of intermediate regimes is whether 
the exchange rate should be allowed to fluctuate a bit more or less. Moving from a fixed rate to a free float 
or vice versa would be a virtual revolution, which is likely only with crisis situations. It is not expected to 
happen frequently. Nonetheless, studies on the issue of exchange rate regime still mainly deal with two 
polar regimes of fixed and flexible exchange rates. Their implications on exchange rate policy are limited 
and could be misleading.  
In this paper, we investigate the effects of modifying exchange rate flexibility in small steps 
instead of comparing the polar regimes of fixed and flexible rates. We consider an exchange rate regime 
similar to a target zone system in which central bank interventions limit exchange rate changes within 
                                                 
 
1 Alesina and Wagner (2003) assess institutional reasons to explain why behavior of some 
countries reflects a “fear of floating” while other countries exhibit a “fear of pegging.”   4
prescribed fluctuation bands. As a hybrid of fixed and flexible exchange rate systems, target zones have 
been a popular choice, de facto or de jure, among both developed and developing countries. This popularity 
is likely due to the fact that the system of target zones can potentially provide some exchange rate 
flexibility and monetary independence to shield exports and the current account from adverse shocks while 
at the same time providing the stability and anti-inflation commitment of fixed rates as long as the policy 
authority can credibly correct movements outside the band. See, inter alia, Williamson (1983, 2000), 
Frenkel and Goldstein (1986), and Svensson (1992, 1994) for more detailed discussion of the target zone 
system.
2 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss estimation and specification 
of a simple macroeconomic model in which the central bank uses its foreign assets to intervene in the 
foreign exchange market. Section 3 introduces the simulation methodology based on the VAR model. The 
simulation results are reported in Section 4. The paper concludes with discussion in Section 5. 
 
2. The Model 
2.1 Overview 
Using data from the post-Bretton Woods period, we estimate for a set of five major countries 
(Japan, Germany, the U.K., France and Canada) models in which we can evaluate the effects of exchange 
rate bandwidth on model variables. Specifically, we use the semi-structural VAR technique of Bernanke 
and Mihov (1998) to divide the model for each country into one block of variables representing the 
“fundamentals” for the exchange rate (world output and inflation, a supply shock, and domestic output and 
inflation) and another representing financial market conditions (the exchange rate, foreign reserve holdings, 
                                                 
 
2 The target zone system had been employed in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the 
European Monetary System (EMS) until its transition to the single currency system of the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU). While officially on an independent float, Canada is also known to have used a de 
facto moving band around the US dollar with bandwidth equal to ±2 percent since May 1970 (Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2002). The G3 (the U.S., Japan, and Germany), however, have never actively pursued such an 
arrangement among themselves except for a brief period that started with the Louvre Accord in February 
1987. In the latter, the G3 pledged to stabilize nominal exchange rates around the levels then prevailing. 
Target zones were set up with bands of ± 5 percent around the rates of DM1.8250/$ and ￥153.50/$. The 
range for the yen/dollar rate was adjusted in April 1987. The brief period of exchange rate stability ended 
with the stock market crash of October 1987.   5
the quantity of money, and domestic and world interest rates). A structural specification for the second 
block allows us to recover estimates of the structural shocks of the variables in this block. 
  Choosing the width of the exchange rate band and determining the method of intervention to 
enforce the band are important components of a monetary policy rule. In this paper, we use as the policy 
instrument the shock to the equation for central bank holdings of foreign reserves and then empirically 
determine the macroeconomic implications of various exchange rate bandwidths. We do so by identifying 
key structural elements of models of each country, including the policy shocks. Conditional on the 
assumption that the structural shocks are independent of each other, we can manipulate this shock without 
having implications for the other model shocks. Thus, we can use the shock in the policy equation to 
manage the exchange rate when it would otherwise violate the boundaries of the exchange rate band. These 
policy interventions, when combined with the other equation disturbances, can be used to construct the 
dynamic path the economy will follow given the policy interventions. Bootstrap trials then allow us to 
estimate the variances of key variables, such as output and inflation, implied by various bandwidths. 
After specifying a particular bandwidth, we undertake a counterfactual analysis in which we take 
random draws from the estimated residuals. Using the moving average representation, this set of residuals 
implies values for all system variables, including the exchange rate. If the draw implies an exchange rate 
outside the band, then a policy response, in our case a shock to the equation for foreign reserves holdings, 
is computed that will return the exchange rate to the band. This policy shock, combined with the other 
shocks to the other equations, then implies values of the other variables under the chosen bandwidth. A 
large number of such draws then allows computation of statistics of interest, such as the standard deviations 
of output, inflation, and the domestic interest rate. Conducting these types of bootstrap experiments with 
different bandwidths then allows us to reach conclusions of how marginal changes in exchange rate policy 
affect economic outcomes.  Since changes in exchange rate flexibility are small in each step, we have more 
assurance that the assumption of structural constancy can be a reasonable approximation, at least in the 
range of the actual (though perhaps implied) exchange rate variability allowed by the policy authority. 
Since one of main goals of this paper is to investigate the effects of exchange rate flexibility 
without drastic changes in regime itself, we pay close attention to the possibility that interventions are too   6
frequent or too extreme.
3 In terms of our model, interventions that lead to negative rates of interest or 
negative foreign reserve holding are possible symptoms of such extremity. Interest rates, however, became 
negative especially when the band is very narrow, probably because rates were extremely low towards the 
end of our data set and there was not much room to maneuver. We exclude trials in which the nominal 
interest rate is negative in all results reported below. Even if trials with negative interest rates are included, 
however, virtually all the conclusions continue to hold and the empirical results are surprisingly close 
numerically to what we report.
4 
The main findings of the counterfactual experiments can be summarized as follows. The frequency 
and size of interventions declines as the bandwidth widens, as do the number of trials with any intervention. 
The only variable that systematically changes with the bandwidth is the variability of foreign reserves, with 
foreign reserves become more volatile as the bandwidth narrows. Reflecting the fact that the central banks 
of major industrial countries typically sterilize their interventions, however, the money supply is hardly 
related to the variability of the exchange rate. More importantly, greater exchange rate flexibility obtained 
through a wider band neither increases nor decreases volatilities in the interest rate, output, or inflation for 
the majority of cases. These results are broadly consistent with the findings of Baxter and Stockman (1989) 
and Flood and Rose (1995). They also confirm that the “exchange rate disconnect” puzzle (Obstfeld and 
Rogoff, 2000) may indeed be widespread.  
 
 
2.2 Estimation: The General Strategy 
  We use the Bernanke-Mihov (1998) semi-structural VAR to build a model of the financial sector 
of each country’s economy, controlling for broader macroeconomic fundamentals. This approach is useful 
in that it allows us to identify the structural policy shocks without having to identify (perhaps incorrectly) a 
complete structural system.  
As in Bernanke and Mihov, we start with a structural model: 
                                                 
 
3 By design, the analysis does not preclude “instrument instability” where the policy shock needed 
to attain the exchange rate goal fluctuates wildly. 
 
4 In a different context, Cogley and Sargent (2001) restrict the roots in a Bayesian VAR to those 
which do not violate a stability condition, i.e., rejecting draws which produce autoregressive roots outside 
the unit circle. Intuitively, since explosive roots are not observed in the economy they study, the U.S., 
placing a zero probability on such draws seems appropriate. Without modeling it formally, we similarly 
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where  t F  is an (Mx1) vector of fundamentals, t P  is an (Nx1) vector associated with the policy block, 
F
t ε  
and 
p
t ε are the structural shocks associated with these vectors, and the matrices i B ,  i C ,  i D ,  i G , 
F H , and 
p H are, respectively, (M×M), (M×N), (N×M), (N×N), (M×M), and (N×N) coefficient matrices. It is 
assumed that the structural shocks are orthogonal to one another. Under this assumption, non-zero off 
diagonal elements of the
F H and 
p H  matrices allow for shocks to one equation to affect other equations 
contemporaneously. While this assumption is of use in some settings, in our application we set these two 
matrices equal to identity matrices.  
  Notice two features of this system of equations. First, fundamentals are affected by the variables in 
the policy block only with a lag. In our particular case, this means that the variables in  t P  do not affect the 
fundamentals within the month.
5 Second, t P  is expressed in terms of both fundamentals – i.e., variables in 
the  t F vector – as well as in terms of its own lags. As we will summarize below, the Bernanke-Mihov 
approach leads to estimation of the vector of structural shocks in the policy block - i.e., 
p
t ε  - so that  we 
can analyze how this set of structural shocks affects the system, including the relevant influence of the 
fundamentals. 
  Straightforward manipulation of the structural model above yields the reduced-form: 
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with the ij Π derived in the usual way by inverting the matrix of contemporaneous structural coefficients, 
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5In  the case where t P  is a scalar, setting  0 0 = C allows identification of the structural shock of the 
policy variable without needing to identify the entire model, as in Bernanke and Blinder (1992).   8
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t w . Second, we regress
p
t w on 
F
t u , obtaining 
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t u G0 + 
p
t ε ,                         (2) 
where  0 G  is the matrix of “own” contemporaneous structural parameters in the policy block of the original 
model. We estimate 0 G by specifying a model of the variables in the policy block.
6   
  The residuals in equation (2),
p
t ε , represent the structural shocks to the variables in the policy 
block, which then allow construction of the IRFs and VDCs, the usual objects of interest in VAR analysis. 
In addition, and especially important for our purposes, by working under the maintained assumption that 
the structural shocks are independent of one another, we can replace the shocks to the policy equation with 
those needed to attain a given policy objective without, at least as a first approximation, having to consider 
the implications of these counterfactual shocks for the other shocks in the system. 
  For each country, we estimate a 10-variable model. The fundamentals block, F , contains five 
variables: deviations of the log of U.S. industrial production from its Hodrick-Prescott (HP) trend (
f y ~ ), 
the U.S. inflation rate as measured by the log change in the CPI (
f p ∆ ), the change in the log of the world 
price of oil as a proxy for supply shocks, expressed as U.S. dollars per barrel (
oil p ∆ ), deviations of the log 
of domestic production from its HP trend ( y ~), and domestic inflation as measured by the log change in 
CPI ( p ∆ ). The “output gap” for both the U.S. and domestic economies not only gives the model a New 
                                                 
 
6 This observation was first made by Bernanke (1986).   9
Keynesian flavor but, more importantly, allow us to focus on how policymakers use interest rate changes or 
respond to exchange rate fluctuations in order to maintain output at or near its long-term trend level. 
 The  policy  block, P , contains variables related to determination of contemporaneous exchange 
rate changes, including the variable used as the policy tool. P  includes the log change in the central bank’s 
foreign reserve holdings ( fr ∆ ), the log changes in the quantity of money ( m ∆ ), changes in the levels 
(rather than logs) of domestic and foreign (U.S.) interest rates ( i ∆ , 
f i ∆ ), and the deviation of the log of 
the exchange rate around its HP trend (e ~ ). We model the policy authority as managing these percentage 
deviations of the exchange rate around its long run trend, using holdings of foreign reserves as the policy 
instrument. This approach allows policy makers to respond to short-run exchange rate movements without 
eliminating its low-frequency information, a problem in the alternative approach of first-differencing the 
data.
7  
  Note several things about our approach. First, even though we focus on the deviation of the 
exchange rate from its HP trend, this deviation is nonetheless affected by the fundamentals, i.e., the 
variables in the F block. Thus, if during the simulation periods in the experiments conducted below, forces 
in the broader domestic or world economies persistently push this deviation in some particular direction, 
policymakers are modeled as taking these pressures into account. In fact, as we have set up the analysis, if 
such persistent movements occur, then ever-stronger policy actions will be needed to maintain the 
exchange rate in its band, and evidence of these actions will show up in the descriptive statistics of the 
policy actions. Implicitly, then, longer run pressures are accounted for. Second, by employing the deviation 
of the exchange rate around trend as our variable of focus, we mainly discuss the short-run operating 
procedures of policy authorities. That is, the objective of the policymaker on a monthly basis is maintaining 
the exchange rate within a given band.
8 The exchange rate policy considered here is of the leaning-against-
                                                 
 
7 The variables described as log changes (such as the price levels) are computed as the difference 
between the variable in a given month and the same month in the previous year. Thus, they represent 
annualized rates of change. Alternatively, we could have computed annual rates of change by taking the log 
difference of adjacent months and then annualizing these changes. Our view is that there is sufficient noise 
in the monthly changes that annualizing them tends to compound the noise in the monthly data and hence 
make it harder to extract the signals in the data. The interest rates are changes in the variables (not their 
logs).  
 
8 Whether the policymaker has the available resources to manage the exchange rate against its 
longer run trend is problematic. Preliminary analysis suggests that in no case does the policy authority in 
any country run out of foreign reserves in any trial in any experiment.   10
the-wind type to limit the short-run volatility of the exchange rate. Specifically, in the experiments we limit 
these deviations from trend by specifying bandwidths relative to short run fluctuations in the exchange rate 
around trend. 
  
2.3 Specification of the Structural Component of the Model 
  For the level of data aggregation we employ, rather than identifying country-specific models, we 
instead choose to adopt a set of generic identifying restrictions. This approach is similar, for instance, to 
cross-country comparisons of the type reported by Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), Kim and Roubini (2000) 
and Kim (2002). This is not to claim that a “better” set of restrictions for a given country could never be 
found. But we would like to stress that the approach developed below to evaluate the empirical implications 
of various exchange rate bands can be applied to any structural model, so that a researcher with a different 
set of restrictions can still undertake a policy analysis of the type presented here.  
  Our specification of equation (2) above, which allows estimation of the structural parameters in 
the policy block in the original model, is: 
  e i i , m , fr , e ε ) u (u g u g u g u f + − + + = 14 0 13 0 12 0     (2.1) 
 
  fr e fr u g u ε + = 21 , 0         ( 2 . 2 )  
 
  m i i e m f u u g u g u ε + − + = ) ( 34 , 0 31 , 0       ( 2 . 3 )  
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In equations (2.1) – (2.5),  e u , fr u , m u ,  i u , and  f i u  are the individual elements of the 
p
t u vector, with the 
subscripts referring to the exchange rate, holdings of foreign reserves, money, and the domestic and foreign  
 
interest rates. 
  Before beginning explicit discussion of the structural part of the model, note that in equations 
(2.1)-(2.5) we suppress notation relating to the role of the “fundamentals.” That is, each equation also has 
some response to the U.S. output gap, U.S. inflation, the price of oil, as well as the domestic output gap and 
inflation. We have chosen the Bernanke-Mihov approach in large part to avoid having to build a larger   11
structural model with the potential for a relatively large number of “incredible” identifying restrictions. 
Thus, while this approach captures the relevant reduced-form relationship between the fundamentals and 
those variables in the policy block, for our purposes we do not need to model all the underlying structural 
relations in order to attain estimates of the structural policy shocks  
  Equation (2.1) allows the exchange rate to respond to central bank holdings of foreign reserves, 
shocks to money demand, and the interest rate differential between the domestic and world interest rate. 
Equation (2.2) represents the equation for foreign reserve holdings, which respond to the exchange rate. 
Note that the policy  variable,  fr ε , is used for intervention as appropriate, altering the level of foreign 
reserve holdings over and above the endogenous response of these reserves to both the fundamentals as 
well as exchange rate shocks. Through equation (2.2),  fr ε  affects the exchange rate at the margin, which as 
detailed below allows us to maintain the exchange rate inside a pre-specified band. Equation (2.3) is the 
money demand schedule, which responds to the exchange rate as well as the interest rate differential. The 
inclusion of the exchange rate in the money demand schedule reflects the assumption that exchange rate 
variability reflects changes in relative prices of goods across countries, and so alters the quantity of 
domestic currency held for local purchases. The interest rate differential reflects the relative opportunity 
cost of holding the domestic currency. Equation (2.4) assumes that the monetary authority sets the interest 
rate as its monetary policy instrument, and allows the local interest rate to respond to all the other variables. 
In our setup, when the exchange rate is within the pre-specified band, there is modest room for interest rate 
adjustments for domestic control purposes. Equation (2.5) allows the world interest rate to respond to 
fundamentals, but not to contemporaneous movement in variables in the policy block. 
  Equation (2) is estimated according to Bernanke’s (1986) method of moments approach. He notes 
that this estimator provides consistent estimates of the parameters regardless of distributional assumptions 
and that the estimates are numerically equivalent to full information maximum likelihood when the 
structural residuals are normal and the model is just-identified.  
 
2.4 Descriptive Data Analysis 
We employ monthly data for Canada, France, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom. The U.S. 
is used as a proxy for the rest of the world for all cases except France, for which Germany is substituted as   12
the proxy. The basic period of analysis begins in 1975:1, after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system. 
For Canada, Japan and the UK, our estimation ends at 1998:12, with the period 1999:1 – 2001:12 being 
used for counterfactual simulations, to be described below, to evaluate alternative exchange rate bands and 
their implications for the fluctuations of output, inflation, and selected financial market variables. For 
France and Germany, the estimation period ends in 1995:12, with 1996:1-1998:12 being held out for the 
simulations. The shorter period for France and Germany is due to the fact that data on their exchange rates 
ends with the introduction of the euro. 
Table 1 here 
 
  Standard deviations of the main variables employed in this study are reported in Table 1, where 
period I refers to the estimation period and period II to the simulation period. All variables except the 
interest rate are in logs. ∆ denotes the difference operator.
9 Industrial production and the nominal 
exchange rate are expressed as deviations from their Hodrick-Prescott trends. Typical flexible-rate 
countries such as Japan and Germany have large exchange rate changes. The variability of the U.K. pound 
during the estimation period approaches a similar level. In contrast, Canada has maintained much more 
stable exchange rate while officially on a managed float. In period I, the standard error of Canada’s 
exchange rate is even lower than that of France, which has been under a target zone for the majority of the 
period, with the franc-mark rate kept within a narrow band except for several devaluations. 
It appears that most macroeconomic aggregates were more stable during the simulation period 
(period II) than during the estimation period (period I), perhaps reflecting the higher rate of growth in the 
industrialized economies along with lower variability that are said to characterize the ‘new economy’.
10 
Exchange rates became less volatile in all countries, and notably, the standard error declines to less than 
half in the U.K. and virtually disappears in France. Volatility in the interest rate, foreign reserves, money 
supply and inflation declined in all countries without exception. Output was also more stable in period II 
with the exception of Japan.  
                                                 
 
9  Due to seasonality, we use 12-month differencing. 
 
10 We refer to an emerging evaluation of whether the high growth/low volatility of key macro 
indicators are indeed reflective of the so-called new economy, the result of an acceleration of productivty 
growth. It remains an open question as to whether the productivity improvements during the 1990s were 
temporary or permanent, and whether these affected the growth rate, volatility, or both. The issue of 
whether the economy has become more stable is addressed, e.g.,  in Kim and Nelson (1999) and McConnell 
and Perez Quiros (2000); the issue of more rapid growth is discussed in Gordon (2000), Jorgenson and 
Stiroh (1999) and Oliner and Sichel (2000).   13
 
2.5 Estimation Results 
  The results of estimation of the contemporaneous structural parameters, by country, are reported in 
Table 2.  While some of the coefficients are imprecisely estimated, a number of key coefficients are 
significant and of the expected sign. Among them are (i) in the exchange rate equation, we find that 
increases in holdings of foreign assets lead to depreciations (rises in the exchange rates) and that increases 
in the interest rate differential tend to lead to appreciations; (ii) in the equation for foreign reserve holdings, 
a depreciation leads to declines in foreign reserves, presumably as each central bank sells foreign assets to 
limit the fall in the values of its currency; (iii) in the money demand equation, rises in the local interest rate 
relative to world rates leads to declines in the quantity of money demanded; (iv) in the interest-rate setting 
equation, depreciations lead to increases in the domestic interest rate and using domestic assets to acquire 
foreign assets leads to a decline in domestic rates.  
Table 2 here 
 
The contemporaneous coefficients represent only a small portion of the overall model, and 
accepting or rejecting the model based solely on their signs and/or statistical significance is a highly 
restrictive approach. Accordingly, we also present and briefly discuss selected impulse response functions 
since the entire dynamic response of the model to innovations are also of interest. Our focus is on how the 
exchange rate (relative to the HP trend) responds to domestic financial shocks (changes in foreign asset 
holdings, the money stock, and the domestic interest rate) and how exchange rate deviations from trend 
affect these same domestic financial market variables.  
Figure 1 here 
 
For each country, we present in Figure 1 six selected impulse response functions, along with 95% 
confidence bands.
 11 The impulse responses appear reasonable and consistent across countries. For each 
country, the first three panels show the responses of the exchange rate to a unit shock in foreign reserves, 
the interest rate, and money demand, respectively. In all cases except France, the exchange rate rises with 
an increase in foreign reserves indicating that a buying intervention by the monetary authority depreciates 
the domestic currency. Also in all cases except France, the effects on the exchange rate appear to be 
                                                 
 
11 We have employed the Sims-Zha (1995) approach to computation of the confidence bands.   14
significant although they invariably last just a few months. A higher interest rate appreciates the domestic 
currency in all countries but Canada and Japan. However, the effects are significant only in France and 
Germany. A money demand shock, representing a rise in liquidity preference, depreciates the domestic 
currency only in Japan, which is also insignificant. It leads to an appreciation in all other countries with 
some significance in Canada, France, and the UK. The last three panels for each country show the 
responses of foreign reserves, the interest rate, and money, respectively, to a unit shock in the exchange rate. 
In all cases except France, an exchange rate shock is followed by a significant reduction in foreign reserves, 
indicating that these countries have been quite ready to intervene to stabilize the exchange rate. The extent 
of intervention appears to vary across countries, strongest in Canada and weakest in the two ERM countries 
- Germany and France. The fifth panel suggests that, in response to an exchange rate shock, the domestic 
interest rate is raised in all countries except Japan. The last panel suggests that money demand increases in 
the aftermath of a surprise depreciation. Increases in money demand may be due to increases in the import 
prices and the overall price level. Money demand may also increase if domestic assets including money 
become more attractive as the unanticipated depreciation breeds anticipation of currency appreciation. 
Finally, these policy responses seem very short-lived, lasting just a few months.  
The impulse responses suggest that our models behave reasonably well compared to previous 
structural VAR studies such as Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), Cushman and Zha (1997), and Kim and 
Roubini (2000). What is more interesting is that central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market 
through buying and selling foreign reserves is effective and moves the exchange rate and the interest rate in 
the expected direction. The effects on the exchange rate seem to last only a few months, however. These 
results are consistent with recent studies of the effectiveness of central-bank intervention surveyed in 
Edison (1993) and Sarno and Taylor (2001) showing that sterilized intervention is effective through 
portfolio-balance and signaling channels and the effects are mainly short term. It is interesting that we are 
able to confirm the effectiveness of intervention using structural VAR analysis and monthly data unlike 
typical studies that rely on high frequency data and single equation regression of the intervention function.   
 
3. Simulation Methodology   15
  In this section, we present the basic methodology used to evaluate measures of volatility of key 
variables, such as output, inflation, and key financial market variables, for alternative bandwidths. Prior to 
the technical presentation, we provide a brief overview of our approach. 
  We set up the historical decomposition of the VAR, using a planning horizon of 36 months. We 
take a random draw from the set of historical residuals and use these to compute the values of the model 
variables, starting with the residuals drawn for the first month. Combined with the base projection as of the 
end of the estimation period, if the exchange rate is within the pre-specified band, we compute the values of 
the system variables implied by the first month’s shocks and proceed to the next month. However, if the 
value of the exchange rate violates the pre-specified band, a policy intervention is undertaken designed to 
bring the exchange rate back to some pre-determined point within the band. This intervention is represented 
as a shock to the foreign reserves equation, and replaces the shock from the random draw for the foreign 
reserves equation for this particular month. We re-compute the values of the system variables and then 
incorporate the next month’s residuals. Again we test to see if the exchange rate lies inside the band. If it 
does, no intervention is computed; if it does not, we again find the size of the intervention needed to return 
to the band and again re-compute the values of the system variables. As we pass through the planning 
horizon, in some months the policymaker would intervene, and in other months no policy action is needed. 
At the end of a trial, we have the path the system would follow for this particular set of draws combined 
with any needed policy interventions. If policy makers read and react (when needed) to incoming 
information on a monthly basis, then our procedure mimics policy implementation.
12 Repeating these trials, 
sampling from the estimated residuals with replacement, we can simulate the means and standard 
deviations of the variables in the system under the given policy regime, keep track of the frequency of the 
policy interventions, monitor the size of the interventions to compare with the historical shocks to the 
policy equation, etc.  
                                                 
 
12 Thus, we formalize the description of policy formulation and revision described by Blinder 
(1997). In particular, he argues: “First, you plan an entire hypothetical path for your policy instrument, 
from now until the end of the planning horizon, even though you know you will activate only the first step 
of the plan. It is simply illogical to make your current decision in splendid isolation from what you expect 
to do in subsequent periods. Second, when next period actually comes, you must appraise the new 
information that has arrived and make an entirely new multiperiod plan. If the surprises were trivial, that is, 
if the stochastic errors were approximately zero, step one of your new plan will mimic the hypothetical step 
two of your old plan. But if significant new information has arrived, the new plan will differ notably from 
the old one. Third, you must repeat this reappraisal process each and every period.”   16
  Our goal is to simulate policy in the presence of a tolerance band around a given exchange rate 
objective, using foreign reserves as the policy tool.  Three kinds of bandwidths merit attention. At one 
extreme, the policymaker may choose to manage foreign reserves, net of the endogenous response of these 
reserves to other variables in the system, so as to set the bandwidth to zero. This policy amounts to a “hard 
peg” and implies a specific foreign reserves path designed to attain a specific time path for the exchange 
rate.  In terms of a moving average representation, when combined with the other shocks in the system, 
such a path implies specific paths for variables such as output and inflation. Second, the policymaker may 
want to evaluate as the policy objective a given exchange rate path, plus or minus some non-zero tolerance 
range. In this case, a policy intervention is not undertaken unless the exchange rate moves outside the pre-
specified band. The bandwidth, along with the chosen path (the midpoint of the chosen band, for example) 
and a rule as to where to return the exchange rate if it wanders outside the band, presumably determines the 
frequency of policy interventions, the magnitude of the interventions, and the variability of the goal 
variables of output growth and inflation.
13 We presume that the policymaker would like to know the 
behavior of the economy under different, nonzero but finite, bandwidths. Finally, the policymaker may like 
to evaluate the impact of a freely floating exchange rate, which can be thought of as the limiting case of an 
arbitrarily large bandwidth. While we do not explicitly set up a loss function to be minimized subject to our 
empirical model, it is nonetheless easy to compute the values of “loss functions” from these various 
bandwidths by picking a weight for output relative to inflation and using the simulation results to select the 
“optimal” bandwidth.  
  A more detailed investigation of our analysis of policy alternatives begins with the properties of 
the historical decomposition of the moving average representation (MAR) of the structural model. 
Recalling the notation from equation (1), define Π(L) = (I-Π1L
1-...-ΠkL
k). Next define C(L) = [Π(L) ]
-1, 
with C0 = I. Then the MAR of equation (1) is: 
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13 Specifically, policy designed to return to the edge of a band is smaller in magnitude than one 
aimed at returning to an interior value but may need to be undertaken more frequently. Conversely, policy 
aimed at returning to the inside of the band is larger in magnitude but may be undertaken less frequently. 
This tradeoff between magnitude and frequency is important for policy makers who wish to avoid actions 
that cause agents to alter their behavior.   17
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.       ( 3 )  
  To help fix some basic ideas, suppose that one equation, say equation i (in the policy block of 
system (3)), is the equation of the target variable, the exchange rate in this discussion. Let equation j (also 
in the policy block) be the equation for the policy tool, central bank holdings of foreign reserves in our 
example. The element in 
p
t ε corresponding to equation j is the structural shock to the foreign reserves 
equation. The policymaker is seen as using this tool to achieve a particular time path for the dependent 
variable in equation i. The policymaker controls the level of foreign reserves by manipulating the shock in 
the foreign reserves equation. Since transactions in foreign reserves alter the exchange rate, in each trial we 
obtain the appropriate time series of shocks that brings about the desired time path of the exchange rate. We 
refer to the time path of the policy interventions as the ε-path for equation j, or, for brevity, the “ j ε  -path”. 
By choosing a particular  j ε -path, the policy authority reinforces (or offsets) the endogenous response of 
foreign reserves to the economy, in the process producing the desired path for the exchange rate.
14 The 
impact of the chosen  j ε -path on the ultimate variables of interest is also evident from equation (3), where 
system variables are expressed, inter alia, in terms of shocks to the foreign reserves equation. That is, a 
shock to the foreign reserves equation that brings about the desired exchange rate also affects the other 
variables in the economy, whose responses are captured by the appropriate elements of the  α , s C , and 
0 G  matrices. 
  Focusing on the policy block in equation (3), and advancing to period t+h, the policy block may be 
written in terms of its historical decomposition (HD): 
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14 In equation (3), foreign reserves respond to the various shocks in the economy. For shocks other 
than the own shock, the elements of the jth row of the coefficient matrices represent how these reserves 
respond to other variables. Thus, if the εj-path is constrained to zero, then the implied values of reserves 
represent the endogenous response to nonpolicy impulses. With a minor exception to be noted below, we 
view the impact on foreign reserves of the own shock as the exogenous, policy component. Thus the 
foreign reserves equation in system (2) contains both endogenous and exogenous components. This 
distinction between the endogenous and exogenous components of the policy equation is discussed further 
in Bernanke, Gertler and Watson (1997).    18
                                                  ∑ ∑
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s h t s u C u C u C , 22 , 22 , 21 } { α   (4) 
An important aspect of equation (4) is the in-sample accounting identity associated with the HD. 
In particular, from the perspective of time t, the data at time t+h is the sum of four terms. The last two terms 
in (4) represent the dynamic forecast or base projection (BP) of  h t P+  based on information at time t; the 
first of these terms corresponds to the contribution to the BP of the shocks to the fundamentals while the 
second corresponds to the contribution of the shocks to the variables in the policy block. The initial two 
terms in (4) are weighted averages of the actual shocks over the period t+1 to t+h, again with contributions 
from both fundamental and policy block variables.
15 Conditional on the identification of the model, the 
historical decomposition quantifies, period by period, the relative importance of the various shocks to the 
system. Taking into account the terms relating to the BP and the relationship between the 
P
t u and 
p
t ε ,  





















s h t s h t BP D u C P ε   ,    (5) 
where  α s s s C C C , 22 , 21 , 2 + = •  and 
1
0 , 22 , 22 ) (
− − = G I C D s s . 
We exploit this accounting identity in the following way. Model estimation produced not only 
estimates of the structural parameters in the policy block but also estimates of the structural residuals in this 
block. From the perspective of equation (5), at time t we can make a base projection. Using the residuals 
from the random draw we add to the BP the first two terms on the right hand side of equation (5), yielding 
the vector h t P+ .
16  Finally, if the value computed for the exchange rate equation lies outside the desired 
exchange rate band, replace the shocks to the policy variable in equation j with those needed to meet the 
policy objective, retaining the shocks to the other equations. Using these, we can compute the values of the 
elements of  h t P+ , the path the economy will follow under this policy, conditional on this particular draw.
17 
                                                 
15 Note that this identity uses the structural shocks and MAR coefficients estimated using data 
through t+h. Our evaluation of exchange rate targets below will be out-of-sample and so will not be subject 
to this particular problem. 
            
16 Of course, the residuals also allow computation of the variables in the fundamentals block as 
well. 
  
17 Also note that when the elements of the εj-path are small relative to the endogenous component, 
as should be the case with normal policymaking, agents are unlikely to benefit from reassessing the   19
We call this the “fundamental property of counterfactual analysis.” Repeated trials allow us to compute the 
moments of the entire system of variables given the particular policy objective under consideration. 
    The technical steps needed to evaluate a given policy alternative are now discussed. The initial 
step is to show how to compute the policy shocks needed to attain a given path of the exchange rate 
specified by the policymaker. (For the moment, we ignore the possibility of conducting policy with 
tolerance bands; equivalently, we assume the width of the band is zero.) Using the coefficients estimated 
through period t, equation (5) shows the decomposition for a particular period, t+h, in terms of the base 
projections conditional on information at time t and the contributions of non-policy shocks subsequent to t, 
which for now we assume known. Consider the i
th equation in system (5) for h=1: 
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where ik c , 0 , 2•  is the i,k element of the  0 , 2• C matrix,  ik d , 0 , 22  is the i,k element of the  0 , 22 D matrix,  t i BP , , 1  is 
the one-period-ahead base projection for the ith equation at time t, and where
p
t j 1 , + ε  is the shock to the 
foreign reserves equation.
18  
  Suppose we want to find the policy shock that will produce a pre-determined value for the 
exchange rate, denoted by
*
1 , + t i P .  Given the other shocks to the economy, there is an 
p
t j 1 , ˆ + ε  such that: 
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the solution for which is  
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+ Σ − Σ − − = ε ε ,          (6) 
                                                                                                                                                 
systematic policy rule. This is the empirical analog to the arguments by Sims (1982; 1987) and Cooley-
LeRoy-Ramon (1984) that with “normal” policymaking the Lucas critique is unlikely to be violated. 
 
18 We view this shock as, in principle, having two components. One component is the policy 
innovation needed to attain a given objective. A second component represents randomness that will occur 
in the manner in which agents in the economy call on the central bank to exchange domestic currency for 
foreign currency, which policy makers may offset if they choose. While we could model these components 
separately, we have not; instead, we have chosen to represent policy maker behavior as offsetting the 
second component only if, in the absence of policy, this and other forces in the economy would suggest an 
exchange rate outside the pre-specified band.   20
which is the value for the policy shock the policy authority must achieve to attain the target value for the 
exchange rate. This policy response takes into account the values of the fundamentals, expressed in terms 
of the 
F
t u terms, as well as the values of the other variables in the policy block, expressed in terms of the 
p
k ε terms for k ≠ j.  
        Proceeding in a similar manner, it can be shown that the structural residual needed to achieve a 
particular value for 2 , + t i P , denoted by 
*
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Similar iterations produce a path of structural shocks that generate a path for h t i P + ,  that matches the desired 
path 
*
, h t i P + , for h = 1,...,T, where T is the planning horizon.  This path of structural shocks for the policy 
variable, combined with the values of the shocks to the other variables, then produces an expected path for 
the system as a whole.
19 
  Note that in computing the policy shock needed to attain the policy objective, as in equations (6) 
and (7), we assume that the policy maker can observe the set of shocks and respond within the period 
represented by the data frequency, monthly in our case. In markets as deep as the worldwide financial 
markets, including the currency markets, this seems a reasonable approximation. An alternative that could 
be explored, but which we have not, is to allow the exchange rate to move outside the band in a particular 
month, pursuing policy actions that would return the exchange rate to its objective the following month 
(assuming no further shocks in the second month in this sequence).
20 
  The second step in constructing the algorithm we use in the experiments below is to compute the  j ε  
-path when the objective is keeping the exchange rate within a target band. For some period t+r, r=1,…,T, 
                                                 
19 Note that if the values for 
* P  follow the actual data, then the system as a whole follows the actual 
path of the data. 
           
20 It is also possible to compute the policy shocks needed to return the exchange rate to the band 
more gradually if desired.   21
we want the exchange rate within the pre-specified band τ ± +
*
, r t i P  where τ  is half the bandwidth.
21 It may 
be that no policy intervention is needed, which will occur when 
τ ε ε τ + < + + + < − +
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where 
p
q r t j − + , ˆ ε , q=0,…,r-1, are the shocks to the policy equation, some of which may represent policy 
interventions undertaken prior to period t+r to attain that period’s objective, and some of which may simply 
represent the random draw for those periods in which no policy intervention is needed. That is, when the 
above inequalities hold, the shocks in the economy, combined with the base projection, imply an exchange 
rate within the target band, so that no policy intervention is required in period r. If, on the other hand,  
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the endogenous forces in the economy, along with any previous policy interventions, produce values for the 
exchange rate outside the band. Then a policy intervention is needed to return the exchange rate either to 
the edge of the band or to some pre-specified value interior to it. For instance, if the policy choice is to 
return to the edge of the band, as we assume in the following exercise, then the policy innovations 
analogous to those in equations (6) and (7) are computed so as to attain τ ± +
*
, r t i P , depending on whether 
the exchange rate is expected to be above or below the tolerance range.
22 
                                                 
21 As specified, the band is symmetric. It is straightforward to allow for asymmetric bands. Also 
note that the path for the target, 
*
, h t i P + , need not be constant. For instance, we could allow for a crawling 
peg with a band around it. 
22 It is widely accepted that intra-marginal interventions were frequent under the ERM. Our 
assumption about the intervention mode, although somewhat simplistic, has an advantage that it allows us 
to avoid the arbitrary decision regarding how much deviation from the central rate prompts intervention and 
which level the central bank intends to push the exchange rate to after intervention. See Krugman (1991) 
and Svensson (1992), for details.   22
  In the experiments below, we specify a target path, construct a band around this path, and then 
take 1000 draws from the estimated residuals by employing a bootstrap.  Note that in this approach, we do 
not impose an arbitrary assumption about the probability density generating the residuals. Rather, by 
sampling from the estimated residuals, we hope to capture the type of randomness that is in the economy. 
For each trial, computed values for the system variables, consistent with our fundamental property, are 
those the economy will follow under the assumed  j ε  -path that attains the desired exchange rate path, 
given the shocks to the other equations.
23 
  To reinforce the earlier discussion of how the policy process is mimicked by our approach, note 
that the iterative process by which we compute
p
t j 1 , ˆ + ε , 
p
t j 2 , ˆ + ε , …, incorporates the ‘new information’ that 
has arrived in the form of the shocks to the entire ε vector in the previous periods. If the realized values of 
these shocks are negligible, the shocks are such that the exchange rate stays within the target zone. But the 
policy shocks are modified in response to realizations of shocks to any system variables when they move 
the exchange rate outside the target zone.  
  
4. Simulation Results 
  The panels in Table 3 contain selected results for the countries in the sample. Prior to discussing 
specific results, several comments about Table 3 are needed. First, the target zone in each experiment is 
expressed in terms of percentage deviations around the HP trend. That is, we adopt the position that at least 
in the short-run, the policy authority does not (or cannot) alter the fundamental forces in the domestic 
economy relative to the world economy, so that management of the exchange rate is relative to the existing 
value of the trend.
24  Second, as indicated above, in the reported results we have excluded trials for which 
                                                 
23 In addition to the additive uncertainty obtained when we draw from the actual residuals, it is also  
possible to incorporate multiplicative uncertainty in the spirit of Brainard (1967) by using the computed 
standard errors of the coefficients.  For simplicity, we do not undertake this exercise here. 
24 We are modeling the deviation of the log of the exchange rate from its HP trend, 
) / log( log log t t t t e e e e = − , where  t e log is the HP trend. The target zone is constructed as  t e log  ± (half 
bandwidth), and the policy authority responds if  t e log is outside this range. For instance, for a ±2% band, 
the target zone would be  )] exp log( ), exp [log( ) log(exp log 02 . 0 log
02 . 0 02 . 0 02 . 0 + − = ± = ± t t t t e e e e . In terms of 
the level of the exchange rate,  it would be ±2% around the target rate,  t e .   23
the domestic interest rate turns out to be negative.
25 Third, we increase the bandwidth in each country until 
it becomes wide enough that no policy interventions are called for. For Canada, this threshold is ±10% and 
for France it is ±5%, so no additional results are reported for in those panels.  
Table 3 here 
  The first two rows of each panel show the number of policy interventions needed under the 
various bandwidths for the alternative cases where the exchange rate is above and below the pre-specified 
bands. Note that each experiment has 1000 trials, and each trial has a 36 month horizon. Thus, for example, 
using Canada and a ±1% bandwidth, we intervene 3,466 times of the 36,000 months in the trials when the 
exchange rate violates the top of the band, and 4,113 times when the exchange rate is below the band. 
(Note that lower in the table we also report these statistics combined in the form of the average number of 
interventions per trial, which adds together these numbers and divides by the number of trials. For instance, 
for Canada for the ± 1% bandwidth, we report average interventions per trial of 7.6.) 
  The remaining rows of each table give impressionistic evidence as to whether the Lucas critique is 
applicable. Before starting a review of this evidence in rows 3 and 4 of each panel, recall that when the 
exchange rate is within the target band, the shock to the foreign reserves equation is simply the result of the 
random draw for that particular trial. When the exchange rate is outside the band, the foreign reserves 
shock is computed so as to return the exchange rate to the edge of the band. Thus, for each of the 1000 
trials, we have a vector of length 1000 where element i of this vector represents the maximum shock to the 
foreign reserves equation in trial i. Similarly, there is another vector in which element i is the minimum 
shock in trial i. The intent is to discover if the required policy interventions are far outside the bounds of the 
historical record; that is, whether these interventions are frequent and unusually large in absolute value.
26 
When the band is narrow, we relatively frequently need to replace the random draws with computations of 
the shocks needed to return to the band. If these interventions are large and/or frequent enough, then policy 
                                                 
 
25 We have also performed experiments where we include trials with negative interest rates. 
Results and conclusions from experiments that include cases where the counterfactual nominal rate is 
negative not only remain unchanged, but are surprisingly close numerically to what we report. 
 
26 One formal possibility is to investigate the policy innovations as draws from a mixture of 
distributions. For example, suppose the actual residuals are normally distributed. If the interventions that 
occur when the exchange rate lies outside the band are also drawn from a normal distribution but perhaps 
with a different mean and/or variance, it should be possible to draw inferences about whether the policy 
actions when the exchange rate lies outside the band are from the same distribution. For now, though, we 
focus on the more casual analysis outlined in the text.   24
makers would need to be concerned about whether policy interventions were signaling to agents that the 
model had changed in some fundamental way; if not, then policy makers have a much better chance at 
implementing the indicated policy without having to worry about Lucas critique issues. Note that as the 
band widens and fewer policy interventions are needed, the distribution of the elements of these vectors 
will converge to the distribution of the actual residuals in the foreign reserves equation. 
  We report in rows 3 and 4, respectively, the 95th percentile of the maximum shocks and the 5th 
percentile of the minimum shocks across the 1000 trials. (We cut off the tails to avoid outliers; however, 
this has virtually no effect on the reported results as there is little difference between these percentiles and 
the absolute maximum or minimum.) We also report the interquartile ranges for the vectors of maximum 
and minimum shocks to obtain an impression of both the central tendency and variability of these shocks. 
In the cells labeling these rows, we also note the maximum and minimum structural residuals from the 
estimation. For example, for France with the ±2% band, the 95
th percentile for positive policy shocks was 
.370, and the interquartile range was (.153, .077) compared with a maximum in-sample residual for the 
foreign reserves equation of .132. For the 5
th percentile for negative policy shocks, the extreme value in the 
interventions was -.227 with an interquartile range of (-.062, -.110) compared with a value of -.104 in the 
estimated residuals.  
  Our general observation from the results in rows 3 and 4 is that for all the countries in our sample, 
when exchange rate targets are controlled with a bandwidth of ±5%, the extreme values of the policy 
interventions are seldom larger than a factor of about 1.2 of the largest residual from the estimation. At 
least casually, policy authorities should be able to pursue an exchange rate within about five percent of its 
long run trend without needing unduly large policy shocks. Note that this includes the cases of Germany, 
Japan and the UK for whom frequent interventions are made in this range.  
  The remaining rows of each panel give additional information on whether the Lucas critique may 
be appropriate. Row 5 reports on the average number of interventions per trial, along with the computed 
standard deviation. This row allows the reader to judge whether the interventions are “frequent enough” to 
alert agents that a policy different than what may have been observed in the estimation period is in place, 
regardless of the size of the interventions reported above. Row 6 reports on the average maximum number   25
of consecutive months of intervention, also with a standard deviation.
27 Rows 5 and 6 are included, in 
addition to rows 3 and 4, since it may be not only the size of the policy shocks relative to estimated 
residuals that signal to agents that a new policy is in place, but also the frequency and/or duration of 
intervention. The final row reports on the number of the 1000 trials which require any intervention. 
  The frequency and size of interventions declines as the bandwidth widens, as do the number of 
trials with any intervention. In all countries, with a 15% band, little or no intervention is necessary. The 
results indicate that maintaining a narrow band is possible only with relatively frequent, relatively large-
sized interventions. For instance, maintaining a ±1% band around the German mark requires on average 
interventions in 27 out of 36 months. However, for ±1% bands, the sizes of policy shocks are large and 
often well outside the boundary set by actual maximum or minimum values. On the other hand, midsize 
bands of ±5% to ±10 % would not cause excessive strain in any of the economies we examine in that the 
number of interventions in most cases is in the range of three or four months using a 36 month horizon. 
These results on frequency are in addition to those noted above, where the size of the shocks for 
bandwidths in the range of ±5% is also not unduly large. It is also interesting to note that the “comfortable” 
degree of exchange rate flexibility closely matches actual flexibility that each country has experienced. For 
instance, countries that have maintained fairly narrow exchange rate bands such as Canada and France may 
handle a 5% band with little difficulty. For the other countries, typical floaters such as Germany, Japan, and 
the UK, the same bandwidth may likely cause some strain and perhaps a wider band such as 10% or so 
appears more plausible. With a 10% band, the need for intervention is reduced to less than one in 36 
months in all three floaters. Incidentally, most proposals of target zones for G-3 currencies recommend ±10 
to 15 % (Clarida, 2000)
28 ; our results suggest that bands on the order of ±5 to 10 % may also be viable. 
                                                 
 
27 We have only kept track of whether interventions are needed. Thus, when we report on average 
maximum consecutive interventions, some of the interventions in a given trial may be negative and some 
may be positive. 
28 According to Reinhart and Rogoff (2002), Canada has been on unofficial target zone with a 2% 
band against the US dollar since May 31, 1970. France, under ERM, had maintained a 2.25% band against 
the mark. Although the band was widened to ±15% in the aftermath of the 1992-3 financial crises of the 
EMS, France kept the exchange rate close to the parity. This is shown in Table 1. Standard deviation of the 
exchange rate (deviation from the HP trend) is lower in the recent simulation period than in the earlier 
estimation period. 
Germany and Japan are considered quintessential floaters against the dollar. Although both 
exchange rates became slightly more stable in the simulation period than in the estimation period, the 
difference appears insignificant. In the case of the UK, the exchange rate was as volatile as the mark or yen   26
Figure 2 here 
 
Six plots for each country shown in Figure 2 summarize the main results of this paper. Each plot shows 
changes in the standard deviation over the final 24 months (of the 36 month simulation period) of a 
particular variable as the bandwidth varies. We drop the initial 12 months to guard against  initial 
conditions affecting the results. We consider various bandwidths: ±1, ±2, ±5, ±10, and ±15. The maximum 
bandwidth we consider is ±99 %, which approximates a float, and is shown on the far right side of each 
plot.  
  The first row of plots shows that across countries exchange rates become more variable as the 
band widens. It should be noted that, even with an extremely wide band, the exchange rate changes may be 
at least partially constrained by actual data. For instance, the standard deviation of simulated exchange rate 
changes never goes beyond 1.5% for Canada. In all cases, it is held within a 5 % range. 
  The second row in Figure 2 shows that with a wider band, the standard deviation of changes in 
foreign reserves in most countries declines since the central bank does not have to intervene as often or as 
aggressively. In marked contrast, money supply variability, shown in row 3, appears hardly affected by 
variations in the bandwidth, excluding the case for France. Although we do not constrain the results by 
imposing sterilized intervention, they are consistent with the conventional wisdom that most interventions 
are sterilized.  
  Interest rate volatility, shown in the fourth row, seems hardly affected by exchange rate bands with 
the sole exception of the narrowest band for France. This suggests that (presumably sterilized) intervention 
does not entail significant changes in the interest rate.
29 In Japan and Germany, whose interest rates would 
affect more countries in the world, varying the width of the exchange rate bands has little or no effect on 
interest rate volatility. 
  The issue of whether a wider band reduces output or inflation volatility is addressed in rows 5 and 
6 of Figure 2. Both output and inflation volatilities decline sharply in France as the bandwidth increases 
                                                                                                                                                 
in the estimation period. In the recent period, however, there is some noticeable reduction in exchange rate 
volatility. 
29 In developing countries, in sharp contrast, sterilized intervention (in support of the domestic 
currency) tends to increase the domestic interest rate, which constitutes a nonnegligible cost of intervention. 
See Calvo (1991).   27
from 1 to 2%, but little thereafter. In Germany, the standard deviation of output declines almost 20 percent 
by moving from a 1% to a 5 % band. Some considerations suggest that it is difficult to consider these cases 
as representative. First of all, these volatility reductions occur when the band widens from a very narrow 
range of 1 or 2%. As mentioned above, the results obtained from such narrow bands are less reliable and 
should be viewed with more care especially when the band under consideration is very different from the 
actual band. In all other cases, neither output nor inflation volatility is affected by changes in bandwidths, 
especially around the realistic ranges of 5 to 10%.
30 
Our findings are generally consistent with Baxter and Stockman (1989), Flood and Rose (1995), 
and Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000a).
31 These authors suggest that the increases in real and nominal exchange 
rate volatilities since the move to the generalized float in 1973 have not been associated with any 
significant changes in volatilities of macroeconomic variables. Our results, in addition, suggest that the 
tradeoff between exchange rate and interest rate volatility investigated in Svensson (1991) is not inevitable. 
As a corollary, the suggestion by Reinhart and Reinhart (2001) that the G-3 should be concerned with 
increases in interest rate volatility when they attempt to reduce exchange rate volatility might be misguided. 
This paper also casts doubt on the applicability of the finding by Ghosh et al. (1997) that pegged regimes 
are characterized by lower and more stable inflation but more pronounced output volatility. A more recent 
study by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) shows, consistent with our findings, that exchange rate 
regimes have no significant impact on output growth or volatility in industrial countries although they find 
that greater exchange rate flexibility promotes output stability and growth in developing countries. 
 
                                                 
30 Various proposals have been made regarding the size of bandwidths for target zones for major 
industrial countries. McKinnon (1988) has proposed a quasi-fixed exchange rate regime among the G3 to 
be achieved by monetary policy rules aimed at the exchange rate. Krugman (1989) and Williamson (2000) 
propose wider bands such as ±10 % or wider. Our study seems to suggest that an optimal band could be 
narrower than 10% but probably not narrower than 5% or smaller.  
31 Flood and Rose (1995) find some evidence of a volatility tradeoff between exchange rate and 
output in monthly data for eight industrial countries. However, they find little evidence that greater 
exchange rate flexibility reduces volatility in interest rate, money, or even foreign reserves. The difference 
between their results and ours may be due to the difference in the data period. The 1960-1991 period used 
by Flood and Rose (1995) encompasses the Bretton Woods period, which had low foreign reserves 
volatility as well as low exchange rate volatility since at least during early part of the period the pegs were 
credible and speculative attacks on currencies were much rarer due to controls on international capital 
mobility. This suggests that the relationship between the two variables is probably nonlinear and there may 
be other factors that link the two. For instance, when the exchange rate is credibly fixed, it will be stable 
with little or no intervention. When credibility is in doubt, active intervention may not be sufficient to 
stabilize it, causing both the exchange rate and foreign reserves to be more volatile.   28
5. Discussion  
 
In this paper, we develop a methodology with which we can evaluate the stabilizing properties of 
exchange rate flexibility. Instead of dealing with polar regimes, we consider changes in exchange rate 
flexibility at the margin by adjusting the size of exchange rate fluctuation band in a target zone. The main 
findings of paper can be summarized as follows.  
Coefficient estimates and impulse response functions indicate that a generic, small structural VAR 
model employed in this study captures the behavior of key relationships in the foreign exchange and money 
markets of major industrial countries. The IRFs  are consistent with the notion that the effects of 
intervention dissipate in a matter of a few months; intervention can be effective but the effectiveness is 
largely short term. 
Our most notable result is that greater exchange rate flexibility obtained through a wider band 
neither increases nor decreases volatilities in the interest rate, output, or inflation for the majority of cases. 
These results are broadly consistent with the findings of Baxter and Stockman (1989) and Flood and Rose 
(1995). They confirm that the “exchange rate disconnect” puzzle (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000a) may indeed 
be widespread. 
We also find a variety of additional results of interest. First, our results show little effect on the 
variability of the money supply. Specifically, in Table 2 we reported that the during the simulation period, 
the actual standard deviation for log changes in the money supply in Canada was .046. In our experiments 
with Canada pictured in Figure 2, we find that the standard deviation across bandwidths is, with slight 
variability, .036. Similar results hold for France (.017 in the data in the simulation period vs. .018 for 
bandwidths greater than ±1%), Japan (.026 vs. .030) and the United Kingdom (.015 vs. .014). The only 
country where this observation does not hold is Germany (.017 vs. .032). Thus, to the extent that actions by 
countries to sterilize their interventions are in the data, in practice, adoption of target zones and the 
accompanying change in monetary policy would not dramatically alter the stability of key macroeconomic 
variables. Second, we find evidence that intervention significantly affects exchange rate volatility in all 
countries but France. Further, as documented in Table 3, the frequency and size of interventions declines as 
the bandwidth widens, as do the number of trials with any intervention. Third, we find that foreign reserves   29
become more volatile as the exchange rate band is narrowed, reflecting the need for the policy makers to be 
more active in attaining the exchange rate goals. 
An important implication follows from the finding that varying the width of the exchange rate 
band has virtually no impact on the volatility of key macroeconomic variables such as the interest rate, 
output and inflation. Specifically, promoting exchange rate stability, at least at the margin, does not in any 
obvious way result in higher costs typically associated with greater volatility in output or inflation. While in 
some cases very narrow bands do tend to raise output and inflation volatility, our results suggest that 
promoting exchange rate stability in small steps does not obviously sacrifice interest rate stability. The 
results thus support the idea that promoting stable exchange rates is welfare improving from a purely 
domestic point of view. One could make even a stronger case for greater exchange rate stability by 
invoking the fact that both exchange rate and interest rate stability of major industrial countries are public 
goods for countries with heavy external debt. If greater exchange rate stability of the G-3 currencies can be 
obtained with little or no increase in interest rate volatility, pursuing greater exchange rate stability appears 
to be more worthwhile than previously thought; for additional discussion, see Frankel (1999), Mussa, et al ., 
(2000), and Reinhart and Reinhart (2002).
32  
  A variety of topics remain for future research. First, what is the source of the repeated occurrence 
of negative interest rates, especially with narrow bands? It may be a technical issue: in a world with 
historically low interest rates, bootstrapping exercises in which we draw from historical residuals may 
simply imply a relatively high incidence of these negative rates. Since, in our analysis, variability of 
virtually all the variables under discussion is unaffected whether trials with negative rates are included or 
not, it is not obvious that there are any empirical implications. Or, it may be a substantive issue: we have 
assumed that all responses are unilateral. Further analysis that models (at least occasional) policy 
coordination between countries may help address this issue. For example, if a country suspects that 
unilateral action will cause nominal interest rates to approach zero, it may trigger a request to other 
countries for joint action in the currency markets. Second, we have expressed exchange rates for all 
countries terms of the U.S. dollar (except France, where we employ the German mark), but have not 
                                                 
32 On the other hand, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000b) argue that, as domestic rules improve and 
international financial markets become more complete, gains from international cooperation in the setting 
of international monetary rules (such as exchange rate targets) may quite possibly of the second order.   30
modeled any U.S. policy behavior. Of course, U.S. policy action, either in terms of domestic policy 
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Table 1: Standard Deviations  
 
 Canada  France  Germany  Japan  UK  US 
  I II I II I II I II I II I II 
e ~    .014     .013     .016     .003    .042    .035    .047    .037    .042     .020       
i ∆ , 
f i ∆    .031     .013     .026     .014    .022    .007    .021    .002    .031     .012     .026    .018  
fr ∆    .238     .041     .271     .145    .107    .053    .301    .255    .381     .201       
m ∆    .062     .046     .048     .017    .055    .017    .042    .026    .035     .015       
y ~, 
f y ~    .017     .010     .015     .010    .017    .013    .017    .025    .014     .008     .013    .009  
p ∆    .033     .008     .039     .006    .018    .005    .031    .004    .054     .008     .030    .007  
oil p ∆                . 2 9 8       . 3 8 3    
Note: I and II denote the estimation and simulation period, respectively. 
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Table 2: Estimation Results of Structural Policy-Block Parameters 
 Canada  France  Germany  Japan  U.K. 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
     
12 , 0 g      0.30 
  (1.11) 
  -0.13 
  (0.73) 
    0.14 
   (1.53) 
   0.14 
  (0.68) 
   0.17 
  (0.91) 
       
13 , 0 g     -0.12 
  (0.53) 
   0.97 
  (0.56) 
  -1.44 
  (0.85) 
   0.22 
  (1.05) 
  -0.25 
  (0.54) 
       
14 , 0 g     -1.89 
  (1.17) 
  -0.40 
  (1.69) 
  -0.45 
  (2.37) 
  -0.20 
  (0.79) 
  -0.56 
  (1.53) 
       
21 , 0 g    -30.69 
  (2.14) 
   0.36 
  (0.45) 
  -1.24 
  (0.82) 
  -2.43 
  (0.63) 
  -4.17 
  (1.23) 
       
31 , 0 g     -0.21 
  (1.51) 
  -0.13 
  (0.54) 
   0.33 
  (0.67) 
  -0.07 
  (0.28) 
   0.09 
  (1.83) 
       
34 , 0 g     -0.15 
  (0.83) 
  -0.12 
  (1.02) 
   0.03 
  (0.20) 
  -0.39 
  (2.24) 
  -0.03 
  (0.45) 
       
41 , 0 g      0.39 
  (1.88) 
   0.08 
  (2.37) 
   0.05 
  (2.90) 
   0.02 
  (2.04) 
   0.23 
  (2.74) 
       
42 , 0 g     -0.06 
  (3.36) 
  -0.04 
  (2.37) 
  -0.01 
  (1.77) 
  -0.01 
  (2.25) 
  -0.04 
  (2.46) 
       
43 , 0 g     -0.03 
  (0.40) 
   0.01 
  (0.16) 
  -0.04 
  (1.26) 
   0.01 
  (0.68) 
   0.14 
  (0.71) 
       
45 , 0 g     -0.11 
  (0.78) 
   0.02 
  (0.36) 
  -0.04 
  (1.25) 
   0.01 
  (0.42) 
  -0.07 
  (0.63) 
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Table 3: Selected Simulation Results 
 
 
A. Canada  ±1.0% ±2.0% ±5.0% ±10.0% ±15.0%  Float 
1. Interventions at upper bound   3466   743  7  0     
2. Interventions at lower bound  4113   873  0  0     
3. Max policy shock, 95 % 
   (actual maximum: .736; s.d.: 0.25) 
   IQ Range: 75% 


















4. Min policy shock, 5 %  
   (actual minimum: -.720; s.d.: 0.25) 
   IQ Range: 25% 
























5. Mean # of interventions / trial 













6. Mean max consecutive interventions 












7. No of trials with any intervention  935  856  810  779     
 
 
B. France (/Germany)  ±1.0% ±2.0% ±5.0% ±10.0% ±15.0%  Float 
1. Interventions at upper bound       3556      587        0              
2. Interventions at lower bound      4825      348           0              
3. Max policy shock, 95 % 
   (actual maximum: .132; s.d.: 0.038) 
   IQ Range: 75% 
                     25% 
  0.618 
 
  .406 
  .161 
   .370 
 
  .135 
  .077 
  .135 
 
  .112 
  .077 
     
 
   
  
4. Min policy shock, 5 %  
   (actual minimum: -.104; s.d.: 0.038) 
   IQ Range: 25% 
                     75% 
   -2.05 
 
  -.660 
  -.159 
   -.227 
 
  -.110 
  -.062 
  -.128 
 
  -.110 
  -.069 
     
 
   
   
  
5. Mean # of interventions / trial 
   (s.d.) 
   13.7 
   (7.5) 
    1.1 
   (1.6) 
     0 
    
   
     
  
6. Mean max consecutive interventions 
   (s.d.) 
    5.7 
   (4.4) 
    0.8 
   (1.0) 
     0 
    
        
    
  
7. No of trials with any intervention      997      490       0              
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C. Germany  ±1.0% ±2.0% ±5.0% ±10.0% ±15.0%  Float 
1. Interventions at upper bound     14225    10053     3022       218        3       0 
2. Interventions at lower bound    12401     9464     2867       137        5       0 
3. Max policy shock, 95 % 
   (actual maximum: .385; s.d.: 0.066) 
  IQ Range: 75% 
                    25% 
   .892 
 
   .601 
   .261 
   .741 
 
   .665 
   .223 
   .500 
 
   .423 
   .088 
    .358 
 
    .127 
    .088 
   .358 
 
   .217 
   .088 
  .358 
 
  .217 
  .094 
4. Min policy shock, 5 %  
   (actual minimum: -.520; s.d.: 0.066) 
  IQ Range: 25% 
                    75% 
  -.979 
 
  -.660 
  -.309 
  -.800 
 
  -.529 
  -.233 
  -.516 
 
  -.322 
  -.101 
  -.516 
 
  -.264 
  -.087 
  -.516 
 
  -.264 
  -.010 
  -.516 
 
  -.264 
  -.010 
5. Mean # of interventions / trial 
   (s.d.) 
   27.1 
   (4.2) 
   19.8 
   (5.2) 
    5.9 
   (3.6) 
     0.4 
    (0.8) 
    0.01 
   (0.1) 
   0 
 
6. Mean max consecutive interventions 
   (s.d.) 
   13.7 
   (8.0) 
    8.3 
   (5.6) 
    2.7 
   (1.9) 
     0.3 
    (0.6) 
    0.01 
    (0.1) 
   0 
7. No of trials with any intervention     1000   1000     984     240       6      0 
 
 
D. Japan  ±1.0% ±2.0% ±5.0% ±10.0% ±15.0%  Float 
1. Interventions at upper bound     13046    9229     3160      295        6       0 
2. Interventions at lower bound    11265    8234     3016      326       12       0 
3. Max policy shock, 95 % 
   (actual maximum: .381; s.d.: 0.101) 
   IQ Range: 75% 
                     25% 
  .612 
 
  .491 
  .332 
  .545 
 
  .434 
  .268 
  .408 
 
  .284 
  .140 
  .376 
 
  .255 
  .150 
  .376 
 
  .268 
  .173 
  .376 
 
  .268 
  .173 
4. Min policy shock, 5 %  
   (actual minimum: -.323; s.d.: 0.101) 
  IQ Range: 25% 
                    75% 
  -.636 
 
  -.496 




 -.268  
  -.444 
 
  -.312 
  -.141 
  -.333 
 
  -.317 
  -.175 
  -.333 
 
  -.317 
  -.163 
  -.333 
 
  -.317 
  -.186 
5. Mean # of interventions / trial 
   (s.d.) 
   24.8 
   (2.9) 
  18.0   
  (3.5) 
    6.5 
   (2.9) 
    0.6 
   (0.8) 
    0.02 
   (0.1) 
   0 
 
6. Mean max consecutive interventions 
   (s.d.) 
     8.3 
    (3.5) 
   5.0    
  (2.2)   
    2.5 
   (1.1) 
    0.6 
   (0.8) 
    0.02 
   (0.1) 
   0 
7. No of trials with any intervention     1000   1000     998      407      17     0 
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E. United Kingdom  ±1.0% ±2.0% ±5.0% ±10.0% ±15.0%  Float 
1. Interventions at upper bound   14957  10393  2999   229   5  0 
2. Interventions at lower bound  7844  4932  1332  153   6  0 
3. Max policy shock, 95 % 
   (actual maximum: .417; s.d.: 0.114) 
   IQ Range: 75% 

























4. Min policy shock, 5 %  
   (actual minimum: -.543; s.d.: 0.114) 
  IQ Range: 25% 

























5. Mean # of interventions / trial 













6. Mean max consecutive interventions 












7. No of trials with any intervention  1000  1000  989  280   8  0 
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Figure 1: Impulse Responses 
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Figure 2: Bandwidth and Macroeconomic Volatility  
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